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GENERAL OBLIGATIONS LAW

GOL § 15-108: New York Court of Appeals adopts aggregation
method in creditingsettlements to verdicts assessed against nonsettling defendants
GOL section 15-108(a) provides that when a plaintiff negotiates a settlement with one of several defendants, the plaintiff's
recovery against the remaining defendants is reduced by the
greater of the amount paid in settlement, the amount stated in
release, or the settling party's equitable share of fault as apportioned by the jury.' Although the statute prescribes a method for
1 GOL § 15-108(a) (McKinney 1989). Section 15-108 provides:
(a) Effect of release of or covenant not to sue tortfeasors. When a release or
a covenant not to sue or not to enforce a judgment is given to one of two or
more persons liable or claimed to be liable in tort for the same injury, or the
same wrongful death, it does not discharge any of the other tortfeasors from
liability for the injury or wrongful death unless its terms expressly so provide, but it reduces the claim of the releasor against the other tortfeasors to
the extent of any amount stipuleted [sic] by the release or the covenant, or in
the amount of the consideration paid for it, or in the amount of the released
tortfeasor's equitable share of the damages under article fourteen of the civil
practice law and rules, whichever is the greatest.
(b) Release of tortfeasor. A release given in good faith by the injured person
to one tortfeasor as provided in subdivision (a) relieves him from liability to
any other person for contribution as provided in article fourteen of the civil
practice law and rules.
(c) Waiver of contribution. A tortfeasor who has obtained his own release
from liability shall not be entitled to contribution from any other person.
Id.
Prior to the enactment of § 15-108, the release of one defendant discharged all
others. Joseph Kelner & Robert S. Kelner, UnsettlingSettlement Statute-G.O.L. 15108, N.Y. L.J., July 10, 1985, at 1, col. 1. In 1972, New York enacted § 15-108, thereby
allowing plaintiffs to settle with one defendant without forfeiting their rights against
any remaining defendants. Id.
The 1974 amendment was an attempt to counteract some of the effects of Dole v.
Dow Chem. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143,282 N.E.2d 288, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1972). Id.; see In re
Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 971 F.2d 831, 842 (2d Cir. 1992); Williams v. Niske,
81 N.Y.2d 437, 442-43, 615 N.E.2d 1003, 1006, 599 N.Y.S.2d 519, 522 (1993); Governor's Memorandum (N.Y.S. 7935A, N.Y.A. 9192A), reprinted in [1974] N.Y. LEGIs.
ANN. 15, 17 [hereinafter Governor's Memorandum]. Prior to Dole, a defendant who
settled was freed from any further liability claims by the plaintiff and by the remaining defendants. Samuel L. Green, GeneralObligationsLaw Section 15-108:An Unsettling Law, 55 N.Y. ST. B.J. 28, 28 (1983). In Dole, the Court of Appeals held that when
only one of two tortfeasors is sued, the defendant can implead the other tortfeasor for
an equitable apportionment of liability. Dole, 30 N.Y.2d at 148-49, 282 N.E.2d at 292,
331 N.Y.S.2d at 387. Courts later interpreted Dole to mean that a nonsettling defend-
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calculating this type of verdict offset when one tortfeasor settles, it

does not provide a means of calculating the offset when several
defendants settle.2 Consequently, the courts have been forced to
interpret the statute in these situations.' Initially, some courts
required that the offset be calculated on a defendant-by-defendant
basis; that is, by considering each settling tortfeasor individually
and crediting the nonsettling defendant with the greater of the
amount of settlement or the percentage of liability allocated to
that tortfeasor by the jury.4 Recently, however, in Didnerv. Keene
ant could cross-claim for contribution from a settling defendant. See Mead v. Bloom,
62 N.Y.2d 788, 792-93, 465 N.E.2d 1262, 1264, 477 N.Y.S.2d 326, 328 (1984); see, e.g.,
Blass v. Hennessey, 44 A.D.2d 405, 407, 355 N.Y.S.2d 506, 508 (4th Dep't 1974) (holding that defendant's settlement with plaintiffs did not preclude his further liability to
nonsettling defendant). To eliminate this disinccntive to settle, the New York Legislature amended § 15-108 by adding subdivision (b), which prohibits a nonsettling defendant from seeking contribution from one who has settled. GOL § 15-108(b) (McKinney 1989); Williams, 81 N.Y.2d at 442-43, 615 N.E.2d at 1006, 599 N.Y.S.2d at
522; Governor's Memorandum, supra.
As a quid pro quo, the legislature also added subdivision (c), which prohibits the
settling defendant from seeking contribution from the nonsettling defendant. GOL
§ 15-108(c) (McKinney 1989); Gonzales v. Armac Indus., 81 N.Y.2d 1, 5, 611 N.E.2d
261, 263, 595 N.Y.S.2d 360, 362 (1993) ("The settling tortfeasor is relieved from liability to any other person for contribution but, in exchange, is not entitled to obtain
contribution from any other tortfeasor."). As a result, if the amount paid in settlement
exceeds the settling defendant's proportionate share of fault, the "benefit inures to the
remaining wrongdoers who are credited with the amount paid by the settlor." Governor's Memorandum, supra.
2 In re New York City Asbestos Litig., 188 A.D.2d 214, 217-18, 593 N.Y.S.2d 43,
46 (1st Dep't), aff'd, 82 N.Y.2d 342, 624 N.E.2d 979, 604 N.Y.S.2d 884 (1993); Williams v. Niske, 181 A.D.2d 307, 312, 586 N.Y.S.2d 942, 945 (1st Dep't 1992), aff'd, 81
N.Y.2d 437, 615 N.E.2d 1003, 599 N.Y.S.2d 519 (1993).
In 1974, the legislature did not foresee the era of mass tort litigation and thus did
not contemplate the application of § 15-108 to situations where several defendants
negotiated settlements. See In re Eastern and S. Dists. Asbestos Litig., 772 F. Supp.
1380 (E. & S.D.N.Y. 1991), aff'd in part,rev'd in part, 971 F.2d 831 (2d Cir. 1992).
3 New York City Asbestos Litig., 188 A.D. at 218, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 46.
4 See, e.g., In re Joint S. & E. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 760 F. Supp. 33 (E.D.N.Y.
1991); Williams, 181 A.D.2d at 312, 586 N.Y.S.2d at 946; Killeen v. Reinhardt, 71
A.D.2d 851, 419 N.Y.S.2d 175 (2d Dep't 1979); In re New York City Asbestos Litig.,
151 Misc.2d 1, 572 N.Y.S.2d 1006 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1991), aff'd in part and rev'd
in part, 188 A.D.2d 214, 593 N.Y.S.2d 43 (1st Dep't), aff'd 82 N.Y.2d 342, 624 N.E.2d
979, 604 N.Y.S.2d 884 (1993); see also Eastern and S. Dists. Asbestos Litig., 772 F.
Supp. at 1397 (following precedent oflower state courts, but recognizing that aggregation approach better serves objectives of statute).
It should be noted that in Williams, the First Department held that calculating
the reduction on a defendant-by-defendant basis was proper when the jury had not
apportioned fault among the settling defendants. 181 A.D.2d at 310, 586 N.Y.S.2d at
945. The court stated, however, that an aggregation approach might be more appropriate in cases where the jury had allocated liability among the settling defendants.
Id. at 312, 586 N.Y.S.2d at 946.
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Corp. (In re New York City Asbestos Litigation),5 the Court of Appeals rejected this method.6 The court chose instead to adopt an
aggregate approach under which the jury verdict is reduced by the
greater of the total amount paid in settlements or the total share
of liability allocated by the jury to the settling defendants.7
To illustrate the different outcomes under the two methods,
assume a $100,000 jury verdict against three defendants, two of
whom have settled for $40,000 and $10,000, respectively. Further
assume that the jury finds the nonsettling defendant 60% liable
and apportions fault between the two settling defendants as

follows:
% of
Fault

$ Value of
Fault

Amount of
Settlement

A
B

10%
30%

$10,000
$30,000

$40,000
$10,000

TOTAL

40%

$40,000

$50,000

Settling
Defendant

Under the aggregation method, the verdict is offset by the greater
of the total dollar value of fault ($40,000) or the total amount of
the settlements ($50,000).8 Thus, although the nonsettling defendant's share of liability is 60%, he is only responsible for
$50,000 in damages. Nevertheless, the plaintiff recovers the full
amount of the verdict.9
5 82 N.Y.2d 342, 624 N.E.2d 979, 604 N.Y.S.2d 884 (1993).
6 Id. at 351, 624 N.E.2d at 984, 604 N.Y.S.2d at 889.
7

Id.

8 Daniel Wise, Guidance on Splitting Tort Awards Offered, N.Y. L.J. 1 (1993).
9 It should be noted, however, that the aggregation approach does not always result in full recovery for a plaintiff. In re New York City Asbestos Litig., 188 A.D.2d
214, 222-23, 593 N.Y.S.2d 43,49 (1stDep't), aff'd, 82 N.Y.2d 821, 625 N.E.2d 588, 605
N.Y.S.2d 3 (1993). Where the combined shares of liability of the settling defendants
exceed the total amounts paid in settlement, the plaintiff will remain undercompensated. Id. at 223, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 49.
For example, suppose a jury returns a verdict of $100,000 against three defendants. Two of them have entered into settlements with the plaintiff in the amounts of
$10,000 and $20,000, respectively. Further suppose the jury finds the nonsettling defendant 50% liable and apportions fault among the settling defendants as follows:
Settling
% of
$ Value of
Amount of
Defendant
Fault
Fault
Settlement
A

40%

$40,000

$10,000

B

10%

$10,000

$20,000

TOTAL

50%

$50,000

$30,000
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If the offset is calculated on a defendant-by-defendant basis, 10
the results are quite different. 1
Settling
Defendant

% Of
Fault

$ Value of
Fault

Amount of
Settlement

Amount
of Offset

A
B

10%
30%

$10,000
$30,000

$40,000
$10,000

$40,000
$30,000

TOTAL

40%

$40,000

$50,000

$70,000

When each defendant is considered separately, the nonsettling defendant receives a $40,000 credit to the verdict from plaintiff's
settlement with defendant A and a $30,000 offset from the settlement with defendant B. Thus, the nonsettling defendant remains
liable for only $30,000, although his proportional liability was
$60,000. Thus, the plaintiff is undercompensated by $20,000, receiving $80,000 out of a total verdict of $100,000.
Under the aggregation method, since the total value of fault ($50,000) exceeds the
total amount paid in settlements ($30,000), the verdict assessed against the nonsettling defendant is reduced by $50,000. The nonsettling defendant is thus liable for
$50,000. The plaintiff, however, is undercompensated by $20,000, receiving $80,000
out of a $100,000 verdict ($30,000 from the settlement plus $50,000 from the nonsettling defendant).
10 This approach has also been referred to as the case-by-case method or the pick
and choose method. See Gary Spencer, Method Defined to Reduce Verdicts; "Aggregation'Adopted as Means to Account for Settling Defendants, N.Y. L.J. 1 (1993); see also
New York City Asbestos Litig., 82 N.Y.2d at 351, 624 N.E.2d at 984, 604 N.Y.S.2d at
889.
11 See In re Joint E. & S. Dists. Asbestos Litig., 971 F.2d 831, 850 (2d Cir. 1992)
(explaining that choice of calculation method may greatly affect amount of credit).
It should be noted, however, that there may be circumstances in which both
methods yield the same results. This occurs when the plaintiff negotiates either all
favorable or, alternatively, all unfavorable settlements. To illustrate, assume a jury
verdict of $500,000 against four defendants, three of whom have settled with the
plaintiff in the amounts shown below. Further assume that the nonsettling defendant
is held 40% liable and that the jury apportions fault among the settling defendants as
follows:
Settling
% of
$ Value of
Amount of
Amount of
Defendant
Fault
Fault
Settlement
Offset
A

10%

$ 50,000

B

20%

C

30%

$100,000

$100,000

$100,000

$150,000

$150,000

$150,000

$200,000

$200,000

TOTAL
60%
$300,000
$450,000
$450,000
Under these facts, whether the offset is calculated in the aggregate or on an individual defendant basis, the credit to the nonsettling defendant is $450,000.
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In Didner v. Keene Corp., the plaintiff brought an action
against several defendants to recover damages for the wrongful
death of her husband, who died of exposure to asbestos. 12 After
the plaintiff had negotiated settlements with several defendants
and obtained a verdict in her favor, 1 3 defendant Keene Corporation argued that, since the statute speaks in the singular, the verdict reduction should be calculated on a defendant-by-defendant
basis- subtracting for each settling defendant the greater of the
amount paid in settlement or the equitable share of liability attributable to that defendant.' 4 This approach would have reduced
Keene's damages to zero, despite the jury's determination that it
was responsible for 15% of the total liability.' 5 The Appellate Division, First Department, in dictum, stated that the aggregation
method was a better approach to calculating the nonsettling defendant's liability in light of the legislature's goals.' 6 The Court of
Appeals granted the defendant leave to appeal in order to resolve
17
this issue.
Writing for a unanimous court, Judge Hancock opined that
the aggregation approach is preferable since it promotes the statutory goals' 8 of encouraging settlements' 9 and ensuring that nonsettling defendants are not held liable for more than their equita12 188 A.D.2d 15, 17, 593 N.Y.S.2d 238, 240 (1st Dep't), aff'd, 82 N.Y.2d 342, 624
N.E.2d 979, 604 N.Y.S.2d 884 (1993).
13

Id.

Id. at 24, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 244. This argument was also posed by the defendants
in the Brooklyn Naval Shipyard Cases (In re New York City Asbestos Litigation), 188
A.D.2d 214,217,593 N.Y.S.2d 43,45 (1st Dep't), aff'd, 82 N.Y.2d 821, 625 N.E.2d 588,
605 N.Y.S.2d 3 (1993). The Appellate Division rejected the argument, asserting that
use of the word "tortfeasor" in the statute was not "an expression of legislative intent," but was simply an attempt at grammatical conformity with the statutory language addressing settlement with only "one of two or more persons liable." Id. at 223,
593 N.Y.S.2d at 49. Since enactment of § 15-108 preceded the litigation of mass tort
claims, it is unlikely that the legislature contemplated the application of the statute
where the plaintiff reached settlements with several defendants. In re Eastern & S.
Dists. Asbestos Litig., 772 F. Supp. 1380, 1394 (E. & S.D.N.Y. 1991).
15 Didner, 188 A.D.2d at 18, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 240.
16 Id. at 25, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 245.
17 82 N.Y.2d 342, 624 N.E.2d 979, 604 N.Y.S.2d 884 (1993). On the same day, the
Court of Appeals decided two other cases presenting the same issue. See In re New
York City Asbestos Litig., 82 N.Y.2d 821, 625 N.E.2d 588, 605 N.Y.S.2d 3 (1993); Pollicina v. Misericordia Hosp. Medical Ctr., 82 N.Y.2d 332, 624 N.E.2d 332, 624 N.E.2d
974, 604 N.Y.S.2d 879 (1993).
18 Didner, 82 N.Y.2d at 351, 624 N.E.2d 984, 604 N.Y.S.2d 889.
19 Id.; see GOL § 15-108 commentary at 700 (McKinney 1989); see also Rock v.
Reed-Prentice Div. of Package Mach. Co., 39 N.Y.2d 34, 40-41, 346 N.E.2d 520, 524,
382 N.Y.S.2d 720, 723 (1976); Lambert v. HRH Equity Corp., 117 A.D.2d 227, 232-33,
14
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ble share of damages.2 ° In addition, the court maintained that the
aggregation method "avoids the potential injustice" that can result
under the defendant-by-defendant method, that is, "that a nonsettling defendant will be permitted to take advantage of the settlements.., so as to reduce the amount that it pays below its equitable share by cutting the compensation the jury has awarded to
plaintiff."21 In doing so, the court rejected the defendant's argument that the statute's use of singular language requires the off22
set to be calculated by considering each defendant individually.
It is submitted that the Court of Appeals was correct in choosing the aggregation method for calculating nonsettling defendants' damages. In enacting section 15-108, the legislature did not
intend to provide a nonsettling defendant with a windfall while
undercompensating the plaintiff.23 Nevertheless, this type of inequity frequently results when the offsetting credit is calculated
on a defendant-by-defendant basis.24 Although both methods may
sometimes yield the same outcome, 25 in most instances the aggregation method decreases the potential benefit to nonsettling defendants that might otherwise result under the defendant-by-defendant approach.26 The court's decision reflects an attempt to
discourage defendants from proceeding to trial under the errone502 N.Y.S.2d 433, 436 (1st Dep't 1986); Governor's Memorandum, supra note 1, at 17;
Kelner & Kelner, supra note 1, at 1, col.1.

20 Didner, 82 N.Y.2d at 351, 624 N.E.2d at 984, 604 N.Y.S.2d at 889; see GOL
§ 15-108 n.1 (McKinney 1989); Williams v. Niske, 181 A.D.2d 307, 309-10, 586
N.Y.S.2d 942, 944 (1st Dep't 1992), aff'd, 81 N.Y.2d 437, 615 N.E.2d 1003, 599
N.Y.S.2d 519 (1993); Lambert, 117 A.D.2d at 232-33, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 436; Governor's

Memorandum, supra note 1, at 17.
The second goal of the statute is not an issue in the courts' interpretation of § 15108 since either method of calculation will ensure that a nonsettling defendant is not
held liable beyond his equitable share of fault. See supra example in text accompany-

ing notes 7-12.
21 Didner, 82 N.Y.2d at 351, 624 N.E.2d at 984, 604 N.Y.S.2d at 889.
22 Id. The court stated that the statute provides absolutely no guidance as to how
it should be applied when a plaintiff settles with more that one defendant. Id.
23 In re Eastern and S. Dists. Asbestos Litig., 772 F. Supp. 1380, 1396 (E. &

S.D.N.Y. 1991).
24 In re Joint E. & S. Dists. Asbestos Litig., 971 F.2d 831, 850 (2d Cir. 1992) (noting that calculation on individual defendant basis tends to diminish plaintiff's recovery and reduce nonsettling defendant's share of liability).
25 See supra note 11 (providing illustration of how both methods can create same
result).

26 See Spencer, supra note 10, at 1 (stating that calculating offset on defendantby-defendant basis tends to increase reduction to nonsettling defendant's damages);

see, e.g., supra notes 8-12 and accompanying text (illustrating effects of two methods).
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ous assumption that by refusing to settle they can greatly reduce
their ultimate liability.2 7
It is asserted, however, that while adopting the most
favorable approach to section 15-108, the Court of Appeals failed
to acknowledge a fundamental flaw in the statute. Although section 15-108 was enacted to encourage settlements, 28 its application, even when a single tortfeasor settles, has often protected or
even benefitted nonsettling defendants. 29 If the plaintiff negotiates an unfavorable settlement, the award is reduced by the settling defendant's equitable share of fault as apportioned by the
trier of fact, 30 and the nonsettling defendant is liable to the extent
that he is at fault.3 1 However, if the plaintiff negotiates a
favorable settlement, nonsettling defendants may deduct the
amount of the settlement from the verdict, thereby potentially reducing their liability below their share of fault.3 2 By placing the
See In re New York City Asbestos Litig., 188 A.D.2d 214, 218, 593 N.Y.S.2d 43,
46 (1st Dep't), aff'd, 82 N.Y.2d 342, 624 N.E.2d 979, 604 N.Y.S.2d 884 (1993).
28 General Obligations Law Aggregation of Settlements, N.Y. L.J. 21; see supra
note 20.
29 Perry A. Carbone, Comment, RepealingNew York's Post-Settlement Equitable
Share Reduction Scheme: An Idea Whose Time Has Come, 49 ALB. L. REv. 856, 882
(1985) (arguing that "section 15-108 serves to protect interests of nonsettling defendants instead of providing satisfactory framework for dispute resolution"); Court of Appeals Offers Its First Major Decision on How DamagesAre to be Adjusted Under the
Tort Settlement Statute When There Are Multiple Defendants, N.Y. ST. L. DIG., Sept.
1993, at 2 (stating that § 15-108(a) often results in "overindulgence" of nonsettling
defendant); see also Kelner & Kelner, supra note 1, at 16 (asserting that difficulty
with statute is "whichever is the greatest" language).
Subdivision (c) of§ 15-108 also creates a disincentive to settlement by prohibiting
a settling defendant from seeking contribution if he overestimates his liability and
pays more in settlement than his equitable share of the damages. Green, supra note
1, at 29.
30 Id. The difference between the credited share of fault and the amount paid in
settlement is the plaintiff's loss. Id.
31 Id. For example, suppose a plaintiff wins a $50,000 jury verdict, with 20% of
the liability allocated to defendant A and 80% to defendant B. Id. Further suppose
that the plaintiff had previously settled with defendant B for $10,000. Id. Applying
§ 15-108, the verdict is reduced by $40,000 (80% of $50,000) so that the nonsettling
defendant is responsible for $10,000, his equitable share of damages. Id. Under these
facts, the plaintiff only receives $20,000 from a total verdict of $50,000. Id.
32 Id.; Carbone, supra note 29, at 878 n.100. For example, assume a $50,000 jury
verdict with 80% of the liability allocated to defendant A and 20% to defendant B.
Green, supra note 1, at 29. If B settles for $25,000, the $50,000 award is reduced by
that amount, and A pays only $25,000 in damages, despite being found liable for
$40,000 (80% of $50,000). Green, supra note 1, at 29. Section 15-108 was structured in
this way to ensure that a plaintiff would not receive excessive compensation for his
injuries. In re Eastern & S. Dists. Asbestos Litig., 772 F. Supp. 1380, 1392 (E. &
S.D.N.Y. 1991), aff'd in part,rev'd in part, 971 F.2d 831 (2d Cir. 1992).
27
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nonsettling defendant in a no-lose situation, section 15-108 creates a disincentive to settle and thus fails its essential purpose.
Although the New York Legislature enacted section 15-108 to
encourage settlements, 33 the statute, by protecting nonsettling defendants, has failed to consistently achieve this result.3 4

By

adopting the aggregation method, the Court of Appeals has mitigated some of the undesirable effects of the statute. Although the
court's effort is commendable, it must be recognized that the real
solution lies in the legislative re-examination and revision of the
statute. 5 One possible solution, advocated by many critics of this
statute, is the repeal of subsection (c). A repeal of subsection (c)
would allow settling defendants who have overestimated their liability to seek contribution from litigating defendants after liability
has been allocated by a jury.36 This legislative action would continue to foster settlements while perhaps achieving a more equitable outcome for settling defendants.
Bianca Scaramellino

See supra notes 19, 28 and accompanying text.
Green, supra note 1, at 31.
Green, supra note 1, at 31. "Because GOL 15-108 does not adequately balance
the goal of equitable loss sharing among tortfeasors with the goal of encouraging settlements, it is in need of revision." Id.; see Carbone, supra note 29, at 877 (proposing
amendment to statute); Kelner & Kelner, supra note 1, at 16 (illustrating structural
inadequacies in statute).
Some critics of the statute have argued that subdivision (c), which requires a
settling defendant to surrender any rights of contribution, renders § 15-108 self-defeating in its goal of encouraging settlements. As the Honorable Joseph M. McLaughlin has commented, "[subdivision (c)] strikes the writer as a questionable legislative
judgment. If the amount of A's settlement with P exceeds his equitable share of damages, why should he not have the right to turn to B for contribution?" GOL § 15-108
commentary at 702 (McKinney 1989).
36 Carbone, supra note 29, at 884; Green, supra note 1, at 30. Such a repeal
"would encourage partial settlements and promote the primary policy of assuring equity among wrongdoers which governs the resolution of all multiparty litigation."
Green, supra note 1, at 30.
33
34
35

